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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIO NS OF THE IRAQ 
INSURGENCY 
By James A. Russell* 
 
The stakes for the United States in the Iraq insurgency have grown since the end of major 
combat operations was declared more than a year ago, and it becomes steadily more difficult 
to maintain that it is fighting a few disaffected criminals, former regime loyalists and 
terrorists.  While each of these groups may be included in the various insurgent groups, the 
United States is now dealing with an insurgency that appears entrenched and increasingly 
well organized amidst what is an at best ambivalent population that likes the fact that Saddam 
is gone but also now increasingly views the United States as an occupying force and wants it 
gone. The United States now faces a daunting task in trying to regain the strategic initiative-- 
indeed it may be impossible at this point.  But as a critical first step, planners must come to a 
realistic appraisal of the nature of the security environment inside Iraq at the tactical, 
operational and strategic levels.  After this appraisal, policy and military options can be 
realistically evaluated and measured in the context of available resources. 
 
The stakes for the United States in the Iraq 
insurgency have grown since the end of 
major combat operations was declared 
more than a year ago, and it becomes 
steadily more difficult to maintain that the 
United States is fighting a few disaffected 
criminals, former regime loyalists and 
terrorists.  While each of these groups may 
be included in the various insurgent groups, 
the United States is now dealing with an 
insurgency that appears entrenched and 
increasingly well organized amidst what is 
an at best ambivalent population that likes 
the fact that Saddam is gone but also now 
increasingly views the United States as an 
occupying force and wants it gone as well. 
     The insurgency is one of several 
interrelated factors that have combined to 
force policy makers and operational 
commanders into a series of tactical 
decisions which might make sense in 
responding to event s on the ground but 
which inevitably also speak to the fact that 
the United States has lost the strategic 
initiative in Iraq.  Errors in prewar planning 
on sizing and configuring the invasion 
force, along with the misguided planning 
for the supposed "post-conflict" 
environment, have left the United States in 
a largely reactive mode.  
     The United States faces a daunting task 
in trying to regain the strategic initiative--
indeed it may be impossible at this point.  
But as a critical first step, planners must 
come to a realistic appraisal of the nature 
of the security environment inside Iraq at 
the tactical, operational and strategic levels.  
After this appraisal, policy and military 
options can be realistically evaluated and 
measured in the context of available 
resources. 
 
THE IMAGERY OF CONFLICT 
     At the outset, the United States must 
address the impact of global 
communications and media images on 
public perceptions of the conflict not just in 
Iraq but also throughout the region and 
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around the world.  One feature of warfare 
in the modern era is the strategic 
significance of the imagery of conflict.  
These images constitute powerful forces 
shaping nearly instantaneous public 
perceptions at home and abroad.  In 
Vietnam, it was not until the United States 
had been on the ground for seven years that 
images of the conflict began to contribute 
to a public perception that undermined 
widespread support for the war.  In today’s 
world of the global super information 
highway, governments--including the 
United States--have lost the luxury of 
conducting operations in far- flung parts of 
the globe with limited media and public 
exposure to the conduct of the conflict. 
     The grotesque and demeaning images of 
Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison are 
only the latest in a series of images that 
feed negative public perceptions of the Iraq 
conflict around the world. Inside Iraq, the 
powerful images of former Iraqi military 
officers in their old uniforms policing the 
streets of Fallujah makes moot any tactical 
victory the United States might have 
achieved by not having to assault its 
entrenched insurgents.  Those images chill 
the ardor of Iraqis inclined to support U.S. 
efforts, while possibly also escalating 
ethnic and religious conflict inside Iraq.  
     The collective force of these images 
represents a "strategic" dimension of the 
conflict that is not well understood in 
Washington.  The insurgency itself, public 
reaction elsewhere, and the policies of 
many governments all interact to reduce 
support for U.S. efforts in Iraq and 
elsewhere.  
 
THE IRAQ PLAN 
     In assessing the impact of the 
insurgency on U.S. objectives, it is useful 
to review the strategic assumptions that led 
to the war and use them as a benchmark to 
think through the broader implications of 
the insurgency. The architects behind the 
Iraq war in the Bush Administration had a 
clear idea of the strategic objectives of 
invading Iraq and toppling Saddam 
Hussein.  The first assumptive building 
block at the strategic level was that getting 
rid of Saddam was the key to stability 
throughout the region both "defensively"--
removing a threat--and "offensively"--to 
expand the zone of democracy throughout 
the region.   Removing the threat would 
allow the reintegration of Iraq--a 
potentially powerful economic and political 
force -- into the global, rules-based 
international order. 
     The Clinton Administration had 
believed that Saddam could be contained 
more or less indefinitely through the 
forward military presence in the Gulf and 
political and economic isolation enforced 
through bare-knuckles politics in the 
Security Council.  As the Iraq desk officer 
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
from 1996 to 1998, I remember one 
particularly poignant moment when then 
Assistant Secretary David Welch was 
asked how long we could keep up the 
"pressure" in the UN to maintain the 
sanctions regime.  His response went 
something like "as long as we have to; 
indefinitely if necessary."  
     The Bush Administration arrived in 
Washington in 2001 with the idea that 
preservation of the status quo on Iraq was 
unacceptable. Its idea was that a 
democratic Iraq would serve as a beacon 
for political reform and democracy in a 
region that had for the most part been 
neglected during the 1990s on the issue of 
political reform.  The argument was that a 
new political order in Baghdad would spur 
the spread of reform around the region and 
that the new emerging leadership would, in 
turn, be more willing to maintain peace, 
cooperate with the United States, resolve 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and improve the 
lives of their people in a way that would 
reduce terrorism. The invasion and removal 
of Saddam thus was seen as a "win-win" 
situation on all fronts.  
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     But other objectives were also in play 
with the removal of Saddam Hussein. A 
democratic and stable Iraq, it was argued, 
might even become the "epicenter " for a 
new overarching regional security strategy 
in which a reconfigured system of regional 
security would see the U.S. forward 
presence moved from Saudi Arabia and 
redistributed in Iraq and elsewhere, to 
places like al-Udeid in Qatar.  With a 
reduced U.S. forward presence spread out 
more widely in a lower profile, it would be 
freed from the need to defend the region 
and the decade- long mission of 
operationalizing containment of Iraq. 
     Instead, the forward deployed force 
would be better able to address truly 
strategic requirements in the nation’s new 
security strategy, which, among other 
things, calls for a reconfiguration of 
forward deployed forces around the world 
to better address emerging threats in the 
global war on terrorism in the so-called 
"arc of instability. "  The forward deployed 
presence in the Gulf and the Middle East 
assumes a central role in addressing 
military contingencies within this arc, in 
the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, the 
Caucusus and the Central Asian Republics 
as well as South Asia–Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.   
     Also framing these issues, particularly 
after the September 11 attacks, was the 
perceived erosion of the U.S. deterrent 
posture that resulted from the incremental 
use of force in Iraq and elsewhere around 
the world during the 1990s.  The Bush 
Administration believed that the eroded 
deterrent had only emboldened emerging 
new adversaries like al-Qa’ida and drawn 
into question U.S. credibility in addressing 
threats in the new global security 
environment symbolized by the September 
11 attacks.  Instead, so the argument went, 
the United States needed to use force 
decisively and overwhelmingly to defeat 
their immediate adversaries and to 
convince potential new ones of the futility 
of taking up arms against the United States.  
The concept of "dissuasion" of peer 
competitors and adversaries is in fact a 
cornerstone of the Bush Administration’s 
national security strategy.  
  
THE INSURGENCY AND "THE 
PLAN" 
     These same stakes are at play in a 
negative sense in the insurgency, which has 
the potential to force the United States into 
a largely reactive strategic posture in the 
region that will have ripple effects around 
the world. How can this problem be 
managed? 
     A critical first problem to overcome is 
the language and rhetoric being used to 
describe the insurgency.  The insurgency 
represents an obstacle to the achievement 
of U.S. overall strategic objectives and 
needs to be framed in this context.  The 
rhetorical flourishes from both sides of the 
political spectrum cloud and obscure the 
issues at play and prevent a reasoned 
analysis of available choices given 
available resources.  
     In this context, it has become 
increasingly unclear what is meant by 
"winning" and "losing."  What exactly does 
"stay the course" mean?  What does "defeat 
is not an option" mean?  What does "we 
can't cut and run" really mean? For that 
matter, how do we define "victory"?   
     If winning means a peaceful and secure 
and democratic Iraq in six months, at this 
point, this objective seems unattainable.  
Alternatively, does winning mean reducing 
the level of violence and keeping it 
confined to the areas of active insurgency, 
which are still a relatively small part of the 
country?  Is there even such a thing as a 
"military" victory? If a military victory is 
defined as an eradication of the insurgency, 
such an objective also seems unattainable 
in the short term.    
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     As has been obvious from the outset, 
there are insufficient forces on the ground 
in Iraq.  But it is not clear how many more 
troops would be needed if they were 
available or even if there could be a 
military solution to the insurgency.  The 
"how much is enough" question returns us 
to some of the same debates that bedeviled 
military planners dur ing the Vietnam War.  
To outside observers, it looks as if the force 
now on the ground is only sufficient to 
guard enclaves, protect convoys and 
perform other force protection missions 
that drain the resources of the force that 
might be better spent provid ing more 
widespread local security.  Local security, 
it should be remembered, is the means to 
the end – to create an environment where a 
political process can start to unfold that 
will lead to legitimacy and some form of 
self-governance. 
     But it also seems obvious that the 
United States does not have the forces 
available to commit the kinds of numbers 
needed to provide effective local security 
throughout Iraq.  Increasing troop levels in 
Iraq forces difficult choices.  Additional 
troops can only be found by withdrawing 
them from Korea or Bosnia/Kosovo or 
delaying rotations.  All or parts of 9 of the 
Army’s 10 active divisions are either in 
Iraq or Afghanistan. The inescapable 
conclusion is that a "military" solution to 
the insurgency might well require a 
national- level mobilization, the call-up of 
more reserves, and even, conceivably, 
reinstitution of the draft.  These are drastic 
steps, but ones that should be on the 
drawing board to realistically assess the 
costs of isolating the insurgency and 
providing better and more widespread local 
security. 
     A related issue to address is the mix of 
capabilities needed.  Commentators note 
that Iraq is primarily a political problem, 
meaning that the central challenge facing 
the United States in Iraq is not management 
of the insurgency but fashioning a system 
of government that is seen by Iraqis as 
legitimate.  If that is the case, military 
forces should be assigned a secondary role, 
though it is not exactly clear what 
instruments are available to the United 
States to foster such a political process, 
particularly when the security environment 
appears to be in such a precarious state. 
  
OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
     On the tactical level, there are also 
serious problems and issues confronting 
operational commanders. At one level, all 
the Iraqi insurgents have to do is avoid 
"losing" and continue to chip away at U.S. 
forces--inflicting casualties and using 
asymmetric tactics in what is a very 
difficult operational environment for U.S. 
forces.  The insurgents seem to have the 
strategic initiative at this point and can pick 
targets of opportunity at their leisure--
reconstruction activities, aid projects, and 
local police stations, for example.  Time is 
on their side. Both sides know that the 
United States cannot stay forever, and has 
in fact established a series of largely 
arbitrary deadlines that intimate the United 
States may leave Iraq possibly as early as 
2005.  At one level, the existence of a 
resistance at all is seen as a victory 
throughout the Arab world and a sign of 
successful conflict with the seemingly 
omnipotent United States. 
     Age-old rules of warfare--rules the 
United States has tried to rewrite over the 
last decade--are returning.  Billions of 
dollars have been spent on the revolution in 
military affairs around the idea of "effects 
based operations."  This term is defined by 
the Joint Forces Command as: "A process 
for obtaining a desired strategic 
outcome…through the synergistic, 
multiplicative, and cumulative application 
of the full range of military and nonmilitary 
capabilities at the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels."  Whatever this means in 
plain English, it does not apply to the 
environment being defined by the 
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insurgents. There are still casualties being 
inflicted by an enemy that has no shortage 
of weapons and a stream of recruits from 
outside and inside the country to continue 
their attacks. 
     Another concept trumpeted as part of 
network-centric warfare is "information 
superiority in the battle space" that flows 
from operational picture technologies 
created as part of the global command and 
control system.  These technologies, it is 
argued, create situational awareness in the 
area of conflict that can eliminate, or 
severely reduce, the so-called "fog of war." 
But it seems clear that the insurgents are 
making a strong effort to challenge the 
U.S.’s information superiority and may 
even have successfully countered U.S. 
technological advantages. The side with 
low-tech items such as cell phones and 
walkie-talkies--even flag signaling--seems 
to have better battlefield intelligence and 
situational awareness in the active areas.   
     For planners trying to think through the 
implications of moving to a capabilities-
based defense planning system, the 
situation in Iraq reopens wounds first 
inflicted within the U.S. defense-planning 
establishment during the 1990s.  During 
this period, the military found itself 
engaged in high operational tempo 
missions around the world that became 
known as military operations other than 
war, or MOOTW.  Three of the highest 
MOOTW missions in fact addressed Iraq--
Operations Southern--and Northern Watch 
and the Maritime Interception Operations.  
The Air Force in particular bitterly 
complained about the burden of executing 
what it regarded as the pointless and 
seemingly never-ending missions over Iraq.   
     The broader problem with MOOTW 
was that they consumed large amounts of 
cash, burned through equipment and 
strained the force due to the constant 
overseas deployments.  Military planners 
frankly wished that MOOTW would go 
away, and constantly complained to 
Congress and anyone else that would listen 
about the debilitating impact these 
operations were having on the force.  But 
as MOOTW continued to rear its ugly head 
in the 1990s, the Clinton Administration 
was disinclined to encourage the military to 
start reprogramming procurement and 
training programs to better address 
MOOTW scenarios.  Instead, the military 
was permitted to continue buying 
expensive platforms to prepare for 
symmetrical conflict against sophisticated 
and well-armed opponents.  The Bush 
Administration, however, came into office 
signaling that MOOTW would come to an 
end during its tenure. But as the Iraq 
insurgency shows, forward deployed forces 
around the world must be prepared to deal 
with a wide variety of combat and non-
combat contingencies, and it is unlikely 
that this requirement will go away anytime 
soon. 
 
IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
     The long-term impact of the insurgency 
on regional strategy is of course uncertain.   
The longer the insurgency, the more 
difficult it becomes to get down to the 
business of determining the size, location 
and configuration of the forward deployed 
presence and the missions that forces will 
be engaged in, be they related to missions 
directly in theater as part of the global war 
on terrorism or as part of the emerging 
global strike requirement.  An ongoing 
insurgency means that missions for these 
forces will for the most part have to do 
with what are euphemistically called 
"stability operations."  
     What this means in the short term is that 
the regional security environment becomes 
not more benign, as was the hope, but more 
dangerous, suggesting that more forces will 
have to be deployed into the region, not 
just in Iraq but in the supporting 
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components in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
Moreover, this does not address additional 
military requirements for Afghanistan, 
which, while smaller, also represents a 
significant drain on the forward deployed 
global posture.   
     The United States operates on the 
assumption that the supporting components 
in this "system"--the facilities provided in 
the Gulf States--will be available more or 
less indefinitely, which may or may not be 
true. Al-Udeid in Qatar and al-Dhafra in 
the UAE have emerged as critical forward 
nodes for theater-wide operations, 
including Iraq.  The concrete footprint 
being developed at these facilities suggest a 
long-term stay and imply a commitment by 
ruling elites to put up with any domestic 
dissatisfaction that may flow from the U.S. 
military presence.   
 
IMPACT ON DETERRENCE 
     The impact of the insurgency on the 
U.S. deterrent posture is a double-edged 
sword.  The United States used force 
decisively to great effect during the 
conventional military phase of the 
operation.  All of the hundreds of billions 
of dollars lavished on the force over the 
last decade were on display for the world to 
see--integrated ground, air and sea 
operations working together in joint task 
forces--albeit against an incompetent 
opponent.  It is hard to argue that potential 
adversaries weren’t impressed by the 
military’s performance during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.  It’s difficult to see any 
adversary on the horizon today that could 
successfully confront the United States in a 
symmetrical conflict. 
     At the same time, though, the 
applicability of this new way of operating 
in environments like the Iraq insurgency is 
uncertain.  While not being "defeated" in 
the strict military sense, the imagery of the 
conflict reinforces the idea that the United 
States is on the defensive and appears ill 
prepared to deal with a very difficult 
operating environment characterized by 
cultural dissimilarity, language barriers, an 
urban landscape that lends itself to denial 
and deception techniques, a virtually 
endless supply of equipment and munitions 
for the insurgents and last, but not least, a 
steady stream of recruits that will always 
outnumber an ability to neutralize them in a 
strict military sense.  
     So, on the one hand, the U.S. deterrent 
posture is strengthened in terms of the 
conventional phase of combat operations 
but is apparently being weakened in the 
low- intensity spectrum of the conflict 
environment.  How this is perceived around 
the world cannot be empirically 
demonstrated, but it’s a good guess that 
adversaries are playing close attention to 
the tactics, techniques and procedures 
being used by the insurgents and are taking 
copious notes.   
 
THE SITUATION AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES 
     The U.S. ability to introduce a 
legitimate, functioning democracy in the 
short term seems impossible and this fact 
should be acknowledged. Meanwhile, any 
ability to create a security environment in 
which an Iraqi regime could rule the 
country hangs in the balance.  By losing the 
strategic initiative, the United States also 
has less chance to bring regime change in 
Iraq to a successful conclusion as a positive 
force for regional political and economic 
reform. The insurgency also makes it 
harder to introduce programs like the 
Middle East Partnership Initiative or 
Greater Middle East Initiative. Anti-
Americanism, now also being fed by the 
insurgency, means that most governments 
reflexively recoil from U.S. initiatives and 
suggestions. Moreover, by requiring more 
help from Gulf Arab states to support a 
U.S. forward deployed presence reduces 
any incentive to push for democracy and 
transparency.   
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     At the operational level, it seems 
unclear what impact the Iraq insurgency 
will have in the surrounding Gulf States or 
even in the wider region.  The Iraq 
insurgency has become a radicalizing 
rallying cry that, like the daily vitriol 
served up in the regional press on the Arab-
Israeli dispute, becomes a convenient 
distraction for the regimes in confronting 
their own problems.  But by helping 
radicalize the public, the insurgency also 
shrinks the regimes’ abilities or interests in 
enacting reforms, steps they are already 
ambivalent about taking.   
     In terms of broader U.S. strategic 
decisionmaking, the military requirements 
of conducting sustained operations against 
an increasingly well-organized insurgency 
delays the ability to transform the forward 
deployed presence around the world to 
better conform to this "arc of instability" 
that Pentagon planners are worrying about.   
The insurgency also highlights important 
and unanswered questions about the 
conduct of contemporary warfare already 
being debated throughout the U.S. military.  
How are the armed forces supposed to use 
transformation-type technologies, 
especially where cultural barriers perhaps 
constitute the most difficult hurdle in 
conducting successful combat operations?  
Moreover, new technologies have not 
solved the structural shortfalls of 
disproportionate resources being tied up in 
logistics and support as opposed to direct 
combat capability. The new technologies 
only increase the logistical footprint 
necessary to support the operational force 
in distant theaters.  
     More broadly, Pentagon planners need 
to be thinking about the whole issue of 
where the Iraq conflict fits within its 
expectations for those situations requiring 
the use of force.  Press reports indicate that 
the Pentagon wants to set up an office 
analyzing the conduct of future wars.  
Deciding how representative the conflict in 
Iraq is should be the first task for such an 
office.  The implications of an affirmative 
answer are ominous--suggesting a 
continuing need to combat protracted 
insurgencies in urban terrain in culturally 
dissimilar parts of the world.  Fighting 
these kinds of wars require more, not less, 
manpower and the role of expensive new 
technologies is still being defined and may 
frankly be limited.  
 
REGAINING THE STRATEGIC 
INITIATIVE 
     At this point, it is unclear whether the 
U.S. position in Iraq is salvageable in any 
meaningful way.  But in order to try and 
regain the initiative, a number of 
elementary steps suggest themselves. 
     First, there must be an open and honest 
discussion about the nature of the problem 
represented by the insurgency.  There are a 
wide variety of insurgent groups, some of 
which have competing interests and 
objectives.  The Iraq insurgency is a 
complex phenomenon, and its complexities 
must be identified and addressed.  
     Second, the forces of many different 
elements of the U.S. government must be 
integrated into a planning and execution 
mechanism that will focus analytical and 
material support for the Central Command 
and the Coalition Provisional Authority. 
Strong leadership is also needed to 
reintroduce some semblance of discipline 
and order into the clearly dysfunctional 
interagency process in Washington that is 
adversely affecting efforts inside Iraq.     
     Third, there needs to be a reasoned 
assessment of the military and non-military 
resources available to combat the 
insurgency.  If more troops are needed or a 
different mix of on-the-ground capabilities 
is needed, then these capabilities should be 
introduced as soon as practicable.  
     Fourth, as part of a strategy to address 
the imagery of the conflict, Iraqis need to 
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be given visible responsibility for the fate 
of their country.     
     Fifth, the United States should arrive at 
some understanding of what are its 
minimum acceptable outcomes in Iraq.  Is 
the goal merely to ensure there are no 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and no 
Iranian-style radical Islamist regime there? 
Or is it a more ambitious aim of a more 
moderate, stable, and representative 
government? In this context, it must be 
understood that the United States will have 
little influence on such matters once 
elections are held in early 2005. 
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